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ABSTRACT
Technical innovations have converged
with the exploding market demand for
mobile telecommunications to create the
impetus for low-earth orbit (LEO)
communications satellite systems. The so-
called "Little LEOs" propose use of VHF
and UHF spectrum to provide position -
location and data messaging services. The
so-called "Big LEOs" propose to utilize the
RDSS bands to provide voice and data
services. In the United States, several
applications have been filed with the U.S.
Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to construct and operate these
mobile satellite systems. To enable the
prompt introduction of such new technology
services, the FCC is using innovative
approaches to process the applications.
Traditionally, when the FCC is faced with
"mutually exclusive" applications, _ a
grant of one would preclude a grant of the
others, it uses selection mechanisms such as
comparative hearings or lotteries. In the
case of the LEO systems, the FCC has
sought to avoid these time-consuming
approaches by using negotiated rulemakings.
The FCC's objective is to enable the
multiple applicants and other interested
parties to agree on technical and service
rules which will enable the grant of all
qualified applications. With regard to the
VHF/UHF systems, the Advisory Committee
submitted a consensus report to the FCC.
The process for the systems operating in the
bands above 1 GHz involved more parties
and more issues but still provided the FCC
useful technical information to guide the
adoption of rules for the new mobile
satellite service.
INTRODUCrION
Miniaturization has enabled the space
industry to build smaller satellites with more
efficient power. The shrinking of satellites is
accompanied by a decrease in costs, both for
building the satellite and launching it. This
has brought about a revolution in designing
communications satellite systems, and has
enabled entrepreneurs to consider deploying
satellite systems to deliver mobile voice
and/or data communications. Nine
companies have applied to the FCC for
authority to construct and operate
constellations of non-geostationary satellite
systems to provide mobile voice, data and
position-location services.
The FCC instituted a new regulatory
procedure to enable these systems to be
licensed and placed into service promptly.
This procedure is called Negotiated
Rulemaking.
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BELOW 1 GHz APPLICATIONS: THE
LITTLE LEOS
In February 1990, ORBCOMM, a subsidiary
of Orbital Sciences Corporation, filed an
application to build, launch and operate a
constellation of small satellites in low earth
orbit to provide low cost, position
determination and messaging services to
millions of consumers in the United States
and abroad. It represented the first private,
global satellite system designed to provide
direct access to the satellite for the user.
Orbcomm's 24 satellites are projected to
weigh just 330 pounds, with a per satellite
cost of $8.6 million. To keep costs down,
Orbcomm proposed the use of UHF and
VHF frequencies to enable terminals to be
built with currently available radio
components.
LEOs below 1 GHz
ORBCOMM
STARSYS
VITA
Other applications for "Little LEO"
service were filed by STARSYS, Inc., an
affiliate of North American CLS, Inc.,
Volunteers in Technical Assistance VITA),
and Leosat Corporation. North American
CLS provides services and equipment to
North American users of the French/U.S.
Argos satellite system. VITA sought
authorization to use three small satellites for
a packet-switched network, for its non-profit
disaster and medical relief service in
developing countries. Leosat proposed
serving the automotive market primarily.
The FCC consolidated these proposals, and
their associated rulemaking petitions, for
purposes of spectrum allocation,
development of technical and service rules,
and application processing.
The applicants petitioned for
frequencies used primarily in the United
States by the Department of Defense and
for various fixed and mobile services around
the world. After gaining the support of the
United States government, the applicants,
particularly ORBCOMM, marshalled
support for the new mobile satellite service
from countries throughout the world, and
gained the needed spectrum allocations at
the 1992 World Administrative Radio
Conference. The bands allocated are 137-
138 MHz, 148-150.05 MHz, 400.15-401 MHz
and 399.9-400.05 MHz.
ABOVE 1 GHz APPLICATIONS: THE BIG
LEOS
Motorola Satellite Corp., in June, 1990,
announced its plans to launch and operate a
LEO satellite network to provide mobile
voice communications to virtually any point
on earth. The Iridium TM system is essentially
a cellular network with the microwave
repeating towers, consisting originally of 77
satellites, orbiting 413 nautical miles above
the ground. Motorola has since reduced the
number of satellites to 66.
Ellipsat Corp., a small entrepreneurial
firm (Fairchild is now an investor), in
November 1990, filed an FCC application to
launch six small satellites into elliptical orbit,
to provide voice as well as position location
service. In addition to being the first U.S.
commercial system to propose use of
elliptical orbits, Ellipsat was the first of the
LEO applicants to request the RDSS
frequencies for its system.
The RDSS frequencies -- 1610-1626.5
MHz (Earth-to-space) and 2483.5-2500 MHz
(space-to-Earth)-- had been allocated for
position location services at the 1987 World
Administrative Radio Conference on Mobile
Services.
In December 1990,Motorola filed for its
systemwith the FCC, also proposing to use
the RDSS frequencies for the Iridium TM
system. The FCC then established a "cut-off
date," requiring comments on the Motorola
and Ellipsat application, as well as any other
applications proposing to use the RDSS
frequencies, to be filed by June 3, 1991.
Four entities filed applications on June 3,
1991: (1) including Loral Qualcomm
Satellite Services (LOSS) for its 48 satellite
Globalstar TM system; (2) TRW Inc. for a
medium earth orbit, 12 satellite system,
Odyssey_m; (3) Constellation
Communications, for a 48 satellite system,
Aries; and (4) the American Mobile Satellite
Corp., AMSC, for use of the 1616.5-1626.5
MHz band for its geosynchronous mobile
satellite system.
LEOs above 1 GHz
Motorola
Loral Qualcomm
TRW
Constellation
Ellipsat
The United States, with the support of
these entities, was able to obtain a primary
allocation in the 1610-1626.5 MHz and
2483.5-2500 MHz band, and a secondary
allocation in the 1613.8-1626.5 MHz (space-
to-Earth) to accommodate Motorola's desire
to operate bidirectionally in the upper part
of the L-band.
The FCC, in August, 1992, proposed
adopting the spectrum allocations in the
United States. In its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM), ET Docket No. 92-28,
FCC 92-358, the Commission sought
comment on numerous technical aspects
regarding operation of systems in these
bands and noted the need for a separate
proceeding to address MSS service rules and
licensing, as well as the possibility of
adopting a limitation on the type of access
method to be used to maximize sharing
possibilities.
The NPRM highlighted the many
technical issues that would have to be
addressed, if not resolved, before the
Commission could proceed to process the
pending applications. Not the least of these
was Motorola's proposed bidirectional
operation, which vastly complicates, if not
precludes sharing spectrum with any other
communications system, including other
MSS systems. Another thorny issue
concerns the extent to which compatible
operations could be attained by the four
CDMA systems, as well as compatibility with
the FDD-TDD system proposed by
Motorola.
FCC PROCESSING METHODS FOR
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE APPLICATIONS
In the case of applications for the same
spectrum which are "mutually exclusive,"
that is, the grant of one would result in a d_.ge
facto denial of the other, Section 309 of the
Communications Act requires a hearing.
This right was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the case of Ashbacker v. United
State.__...As,326 U.S. 327 (1945) which states
that, %vhere two bona fide applications are
mutually exclusive the grant of one without
a hearing to both" is improper." Hearings
for radio licenses have been used
extensively, although they are expensive and
time-consuming. In some cases, radio
license hearings have taken up to 10 years.
Wherever possible, the FCC has sought
to use various mechanisms to avoid the
hearing requirement of the Communications
Act. The FCC has obtained authority from
the Congress to conduct lotteries and has
used this mechanism, in place of hearings, to
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grant licensesfor suchservicesas cellular,
paging and multipoint distribution service.
In the caseof the domestic-fixedsatellite
service,the Commissionhasestablished
threshold financial qualifications which have
enabled it to eliminate sufficient applicants
for orbital locations to avoid comparative
hearings. The useof so-calledthreshold
qualifications have been permitted by the
Courts.
FCC Processing Methods
• Comparative Hearings
• Lotteries
• Pioneer's Preference
Most recently, the Commission has
developed a "Pioneer's Preference," which it
is attempting to utilize as a threshold
qualification to aid in the processing of
multiple applications. Se___ge,Pioneer's
Preference Order, 6 FCC Rcd 3488 (1991),
recon, granted in part_ denied in part, 7
FCC Rcd 1808 (1992), further recon., FCC
93-116, released March 8, 1993. The
Pioneer's Preference allows an applicant
that demonstrates that it "has developed an
innovative proposal that leads to the
establishment of a service not currently
provided or an enhancement of an existing
service" will be placed on a pioneer's
preference track, and will not be subject to
competing applications. Thus, if otherwise
qualified, the applicants will receive a
license. Other applicants will compete for
the remaining licenses on a separate track.
The Commission has stated that a
preference will not be granted unless there
is sufficient spectrum "to permit at least one
additional license to be granted for the same
geographic area." Further Reconsideration,
Footnote 4.
While noble in intent, the Pioneer's
Preference is based on the subjective
judgment of the FCC as to what is
"innovative." As the financial stakes are
high in numerous new communications
services, such as PCS, disappointed
applicants have already taken the
Commission to Court. This author believes
that ultimately, the use of the Pioneer's
Preference will be determined inconsistent
with rights of applicants to comparative
consideration.
The next approach to expediting the
processing of applications for new
communications services is likely to be the
auctioning of spectrum. The Congress, in
making available spectrum currently
allocated for use by the U.S. government, is
expected to establish an auction mechanism
for commercial use to expedite the use of
the spectrum as well as to provide revenue
for the federal government. There is a
possibility that the Congress may also
authorize the FCC to use auctions for
spectrum other than that which will be made
available from spectrum allocated to the
government. In particular, the Congress is
considering the applicability of auctions to
aware licenses for the provision of Personal
Communications Services (PCS).
In the meantime, the FCC is attempting
to use new alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms to develop technical rules for
new services which will enable it to grant all
qualified applications. This approach will
allow the marketplace, rather than the
government, to determine which systems will
succeed, and which will fail.
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
PROCEEDINGS
The FCC's authority to use a negotiating
committee mechanism is contained in the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5
U.S.C. App. 2, and the Negotiated
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Rulemaking Act of 1990(NRA), Public Law
101-648, November 28, 1990. By law, the
committee consists of representatives of the
parties whose interests will be significantly
affected by the outcome of the rules.
The goal of the Committee is to reach
consensus on the language and substance of
appropriate rules. If a consensus is reached,
it is used as the basis of the FCC's
proposals. If a consensus is not reached,
majority and minority input can still be used
by the FCC in developing regulations. The
Commission can use a negotiated
rulemaking (NRM) process if it determines
that there is a "reasonable likelihood" that
the committee can be adequately staffed
with interested persons able to negotiate in
good faith, and that there is a reasonable
possibility of consensus.
In setting up an advisory committee, the
FCC can identifies specific issues it wishes
addressed, suggests limits as to the number
of participants, and nominates a facilitator
to serve as chair of the committee. The
facilitator is a neutral party, without direct
interest in the rules being discussed, helps
the meetings proceed and manages the
record and minute keeping.
While consensus is the goal, the FCC
recognizes that such will not always be
possible. Accommodation is made for such
an eventuality, with the FCC leaving up to
the committee the definition of consensus.
If necessary, majority and minority reports
can be submitted. Records of the meetings
are placed in the public record and meetings
are open to the public.
USE OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
FOR LEOS BELOW 1 GHz
In October 1991, the FCC issued a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, proposing
allocation of the requested UHFNHF
frequencies to the "little LEOs." In
February 1992, the FCC tentatively awarded
a pioneer's preference award to VITA.
Leosat's application was dismissed as
improperly filed.
Prior to the commencement of the
NRM, Orbcomm, Starsys and VITA met
and agreed on a proposed set of rules,
which were submitted to the FCC. The
joint comments stated that all three systems
could operate compatibly in the spectrum
available. In addition, rules were agreed to
concerning application requirements, license
qualifications and technical conditions.
With this favorable environment, the
NRM was convened, consisting of the
applicants, existing users of the frequencies,
potential band users and adjacent band
users. The parties met for approximately six
weeks and issued a report on September 16,
1992, reflecting the unanimous agreement of
all the parties. This report formed the basis
for the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
issued by the FCC in February 1993.
By all accounts, this first FCC negotiated
rulemaking procedure worked to the
advantage of the applicants, the FCC and
the public interest. The affected parties
quickly reached agreement, expediting FCC
action on the service and technical rules and
enabling the Commission to move forward
on the processing of the applications.
USE OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
FOR LEOS ABOVE 1 GHz
The "Big LEO" regulatory situation is
more complex than that of the "Little
LEOS." This is in part due to the number
of parties (five "Big LEO" applicants plus
AMSC in contrast to two commercial "Little
LEO" applicants and one non-profit
applicant).
In addition, in the Big LEO proceeding,
Motorola has repeatedly emphasized its
requirement for sole use of the spectrum it
seeks (1616-1626.5 MHz on a bidirectional
basis) as well as its unwillingness to revise
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any aspectof its system design.
Having already tentatively concluded not
to award a Pioneer's Preference to any of
the Big LEO applicants, in August 1992, the
FCC proposed the establishment of a
negotiated rulemaking to settle the
outstanding technical and operational rules
for the Big LEO systems. Most importantly,
the Commission was seeking a mechanism
by which it could grant all of the
applications and would not have to make
the hard choices between the Motorola
proposal to band segment, which would
leave virtually unusable spectrum in the
lower L-band to the other applicants, and
the full band sharing approach which would
require major system changes by Motorola.
The FCC identified two primary issues
to be addressed by the NRM: (a) what
technical rules should be adopted for the
service "to maximize the sharing of the
spectrum and the capacity for multiple
entry;" and (b) what technical rules should
be adopted in order for the service to co-
exist with other services.
The NRM began its work on January 13,
1993 and concluded on April 5, 1993. The
Committee consisted of the applicants,
including AMSC, potential future applicant
Celsat, various federal agencies such as
NASA, DOD and the FAA, and
representatives of the aviation industry,
including ARINC and manufacturers of
GLONASS and GPS receivers.
The main issues addressed by the
committee, in addition to the fundamental
question of sharing the available spectrum,
were sharing with radioastronomy,
GLONASS and other primary users of the
band.
As this paper was being written, it
appeared that a majority report --
supporting total band sharing -- and a
minority report proposing band
segmentation, is the most likely outcome.
This result would place the toughest decision
back in the lap of the FCC.
Despite the inability of the negotiation
to unanimously resolve the most difficult
issues, consensus as to methods of sharing
with radioastronomy, GLONASS and other
services appears likely. These parts of the
report, as well as the tremendous amount of
technical material and analysis presented,
constitute valuable inputs to the Commission
as well as the participants. This input will
ease the Commission's enormous task of
resolving this complex, but extremely
important proceeding.
Negotiated Rulemakin2
• less adversarial
• technical focus
• consensus input to FCC
• speeds process
The participants had the opportunity to
work together on complex interference and
sharing issues. This experience should
reduce the controversy over proposed rules
that the FCC issues, provide a useful
foundation for actual system coordinations,
and provide a basis for revising system
technical characteristics to enable the MSS
systems to operate compatibly with other
users of the spectrum.
CONCLUSION
The FCC has now concluded two
negotiated rulemakings. Both involved the
development of rules for new mobile
satellite systems. While a complete
consensus was not achieved in both cases,
the process appears to have reduced costs,
and expedited FCC rulemaking and licensing
actions with resultant benefit to the users of
these new communications services.
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